We argue that philosophers are competent to facilitate public discussion concerning restrictions on human migration across political borders. We also argue that presenting public audiences with a prima facie case for open borders offers a unique opportunity to elucidate important aspects of philosophical reasoning. Finally, we share resources and a lesson plan for those keen to examine the case for open borders with students, or to facilitate public discussion on these issues.

Recently, Anglo-American philosophy has become something of a scandal. The disturbing lack of women and minorities in the field, combined with revelations of institutional discrimination and sexual harassment in several departments of Philosophy, have placed philosophy in the national and international spotlight. Women, racial and ethnic minorities, and other under-represented groups in the discipline have created blogs, conferences, task forces, guides, and other sites to give voice to, and address the concerns of, the philosophically marginalized. It is this background that (...) gave rise to the formation of our panel on diversity at the 59th annual meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association. Our remarks here participate in a much larger, continuing conversation that we are inviting the reader to join. A list of resources for those interested in addressing philosophy’s “diversity problem” is attached at the end of the panel. (shrink)

In this paper I set out to problematize what the distinguished evolutionary biologist, Edward O. Wilson, has presented to a popular audience as his consilience worldview. Wilson's consilience worldview is a metaphysical framework that presumes the existence of an underlying unity in the knowledge gleaned from otherwise diverse modes of intellectual inquiry, and details a particular normative approach for its discovery by scientists. After introducing Wilson's consilience worldview (WCW), I review philosophical and historical literature on the role that values play (...) in scientific inquiry and explain how to understand WCW as a problematic bundle of prescriptive claims concerning the appropriate doing of scientific inquiry. Specifically, I examine deleterious implications for the study of human social behavior that result from attempted application of WCW in order to challenge Wilson's claim that WCW is the most profitable or promising research program to adopt in the study of human social behavior (what I describe as the Fertility objection). Then, I present an argument for why readers of Consilience should regard its central thesis, WCW, skeptically, as potentially deleterious to the process and aims of science (what I describe as the Scientific Integrity objection). (shrink)

This essay is based on remarks I gave as a member of a diversity panel at the 59th Annual Conference of the Florida Philosophical Association. The purpose of the essay is simple and somewhat informal: provide one way to prompt a philosophical discussion about the problem of the lack of diversity in the profession.

The purpose of this study is exposition on the themes of method and mysticism in the work of Simone Weil. Nearly a decade before the onset of her first mystical experience, Weil developed a method to be rigorously applied in daily philosophical reflection. She outlines this method in her dissertation on Descartes (1929-1930). I examine the question of how Weil applied method to philosophical reflection on her mystical experiences (onset 1938-1939). I analyze Weil’s mystical experiences as a type of transformative (...) experience in L. A. Paul’s strict sense of the term. On Paul’s view, an experience is transformative if it is both epistemically and personally transformative. An experience is epistemically transformative if the only way to know what it is like to have it is to have it yourself. An experience is personally transformative if it changes your point of view, including your core preferences (Paul, 2014). I present a thought experiment and textual evidence to motivate the claim that Weil’s mystical experiences meet Paul’s conditions for transformative experience. I then propose two epistemological facts that can be revealed by philosophical reflection on mystical experience. First, it is possible to read meaning erroneously in the appearances of things. Second, it is possible to come to hold to the certainty of a conviction for reasons that elude the intellect. My findings suggest that Weil’s late views on philosophy accommodate these two epistemological constraints, thereby demonstrating a possible connection between Weil’s mystical experiences and her mature views on the nature, scope, and proper method of philosophy. However, my preliminary findings also suggest that Weil’s early work on method may have anticipated these epistemological obstacles prior to the onset of her first mystical experience. Thus, further exposition of Weil’s method is needed to support or elucidate the claim (Rozelle-Stone and Davis, 2021) that Weil’s epistemology underwent significant changes because of her mystical experiences. (shrink)